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Abstract
With the widespread use of collaborative governance mechanisms for mitigating water pollution, 
an opportunity exists to test alternative institutional designs based on collaborative governance 
theory using computer simulation models, particularly when there is a clear relationship between 
governance networks, observable resource allocation decisions, and measurable outcomes. This is 
especially the case for wicked problems like nonpoint source water pollution where there are com-
pelling questions regarding how best to design policies, allocate funds, and build administrative 
capacity to meet water quality standards. We present an agent-based model (ABM) of water gov-
ernance for the Lake Champlain Basin to simulate the impacts of alternative collaborative govern-
ance arrangements on the development of suites of water quality projects. The ABM is connected 
or coupled with land use and phosphorus load accumulation models that are informed by existing 
hydrologic models, project datasets, and state-set load reduction targets. We find that regionally 
arranged collaborative governance in water quality project planning and implementation can lead 
to better water quality outcomes, thereby affirming one of the central premises of collaborative 
governance regime theory. We also find that externally mandated collaboration, as opposed to 
voluntary, self-initiated collaboration, can lead to better water quality outcomes, adding to our 
understanding of which type of collaborative governance arrangement is best suited to the spe-
cific contexts of this case. Further, without adequate administrative capacity in the form of human 
resources located in central network actors to manage project funds, “administrative bottlenecks” 
may form and money can go unspent. This research demonstrates the efficacy of using simula-
tions of alternative institutional design for theory testing and tuning, and policy prototyping.
  
Introduction
Over the last 20  years, theoretical frameworks have 
been advanced to inform the design and implementa-
tion of effective collaborative governance arrangements 
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(Ansell and Gash 2008; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 
2015; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015). Those advancing 
collaborative governance theories often posit that col-
laboration among policy actors tends to produce better 
results (Booher 2004; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; 
Koontz and Johnson 2004; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007), and 
there is building evidence to suggest this is so (Booher 
and Innes 2010; Rogers and Weber 2010; Scott 2015). 
As collaborative governance networks are increasingly 
pursued as key strategies to drive “collective impact” 
(Kania and Kramer 2011) and improve outcomes, pol-
icymakers, rulemakers, and public managers are also 
increasingly interested in questions of collaborative in-
stitutional design and operation (Kamensky 2019).
Calls for the development of experimental collab-
orative platforms to aid in this development through 
the testing of “design rules” have been made (Ansell 
and Gash 2018). While computer simulation models 
have long been used to help stakeholders envision pos-
sible policy solutions, the use of simulations to model 
alternative governance design arrangements using 
meso-level theories of governance originating from 
the field of public administration has begun to take 
root (Eckerd, Campbell, and Kim 2012; Kim 2007; 
Koliba, Zia, and Merrill 2019; Maroulis 2016; Scott 
and Thomas 2017; Zia and Koliba 2013). Drawing on 
a case involving collaborative governance design for 
nonpoint source water pollution mitigation, we em-
ploy an agent-based modeling approach to test specific 
design elements found in collaborative governance the-
ories, and inform actual policy design in the process.
This manuscript highlights how an agent-based model 
(ABM) constructed to simulate alternative institutional 
design configurations is used to test aspects of collabora-
tive governance theory and inform public policy. Taking 
an ABM approach to modeling different institutional 
designs allows us to estimate performance outcomes (in 
the form of reduced phosphorus loads) relative to dif-
ferent design parameters. These performance outcome 
estimates are determined on a regional as opposed to 
local scale. With the ability to manipulate the collabora-
tive dynamics of simulated actors (in this case municipal 
and state government actors) through generating dif-
ferent collaborative (and non-collaborative) pathways, 
the ABM platform enables the aggregation of individual 
actor decision criteria to larger scales of operation, al-
lowing for the emergence of variations in outcomes that 
are contingent upon different governance designs.
The ABM highlighted here integrates spatial context 
and dynamics of the collaborative water governance 
system being employed and considered for the Lake 
Champlain Basin (LCB) in Vermont, United States. 
This water governance model and the framing of initial 
scenarios were informed by stakeholder input, including 
consultation with key policymakers in the LCB as part 
of a transdisciplinary research project that studies this 
social-ecological system as a complex adaptive system 
(Koliba et al. 2016). Using this model, we explore and 
test specific collaborative governance questions relating 
to the efficacy of collaborative governance over “non-
collaborative” governance arrangements (H1); the ef-
ficacy of self-initiated, voluntary collaboration versus 
externally mandated collaboration (H2); the extent to 
which the functional aims of collaboration (planning 
and/or implementation) impacts performance (H3); and 
the role that the persistence of administrative bottle-
necks in the lead organization hinders mitigation (H4).
Testing and Tuning Collaborative and Network 
Governance Theory
The use of collaborative governance to address envir-
onmental problems has long been documented empiric-
ally through comparative case study analysis (Imperial 
2005; Koontz et  al. 2010), a large-N comparative 
study (Scott 2015), social network analysis (Berardo 
and Lubell 2016; Knieper and Pahl-Wostl 2016), and 
observed in historical assessments of eras of environ-
mental policy, specifically found in the increased uses 
of partnerships and incentives beginning in the 1980s 
(Gerlak 2005). Collaborative governance theory has 
been widely applied to environmental policy and gov-
ernance situations and is increasingly being considered 
more intentionally by policy and rulemakers (Booher 
2004; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; Koontz and 
Johnson 2004; Pahl-Wostl et  al. 2007; Scott 2015). 
Collaborative governance can be realized as a form of 
institutional design, leading to the question: “How best 
to design an effective and usable collaborative govern-
ance platform to mitigate environmental pollution?”
Emerson and Nabatchi (2015, 18) define collabora-
tive governance as “the process and structures of public 
policy decision-making and management that engage 
people across boundaries of public agencies, levels of 
government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres 
to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise 
be accomplished.” Theories of collaborative governance 
focus on the critical inputs, processes, and outcomes as-
sociated with effective collaborative governance (Ansell 
and Gash 2008), the internal dynamics of collaborative 
actors and nature of collaborative life cycles (Emerson 
and Nabatchi 2015), and the critical challenges and ex-
ogenous factors that support or hinder effective collab-
orative governance arrangements (Bryson, Crosby, and 
Stone 2015). Collaborative governance is said to be ini-
tiated and evolved within a “multi-layered system con-
text,” which includes resource conditions, policy and 
legal frameworks, power relations, and network char-
acteristics (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2015, 27)
The key premise of collaborative governance re-
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“will produce determinations that are fairer and 
more durable, robust, and efficacious” (Emerson and 
Nabatchi 2015), and we may infer, lead to better per-
formance outcomes. Most collaborative arrangements 
call for the intentional use of institutional design 
(Emerson and Nabatchi 2015, 69; see also Ansell and 
Gash 2018; Koliba et al. 2018; Ostrom 1990) and the 
utilization and exchange of resources (Emerson and 
Nabatchi 2015, 73; see also Rhodes 1997; Emerson 
and Gerlak 2014; Koliba et al. 2018). Across the col-
laborative governance literature, the role of networks 
as the dominant structure shaping institutional rules 
and resource exchange is fairly consistent (Bryson, 
Crosby, and Stone 2015; Emerson and Nabatchi 
2015; Keast and Mandell 2014; Koliba et al. 2018).
Both collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash 
2008; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015) and network gov-
ernance theories (Provan and Kenis 2007) project typ-
ologies relating to idealized states. Both collaborative 
and network governance arrangements may be exter-
nally initiated and led, independently convened and 
network administratively organized, or self-initiated 
and governed through shared leadership arrangements. 
Collaborative governance regime theory tends to em-
phasize how collaborative networks emerge, whereas 
network governance theory stresses the relatively stable 
structures that exist to govern goal-directed networks 
(Provan and Kenis 2007; Milward and Provan 2006). 
The extent to which a particular arrangement fits a given 
context is a question that many theorists and researchers 
in this space have asked (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; 
Keast and Mandell 2014; Milward and Provan 2006).
One of the common critiques of collaborative gov-
ernance theory is the “black box” treatment of net-
work structures in these models (Koliba et al. 2018), 
despite the fact that network characteristics are viewed 
as being an essential feature of collaborative govern-
ance regimes (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; Keast and 
Mandell 2014). To model the structures of collabora-
tive governance regimes, we need a more fully expli-
cated model of network structures to empirically track 
and describe resource flows over time and between or-
ganizational actors.
In network governance theory, the unit of analysis 
is the interorganizational governance network. The 
network is multi-layered (or multi-level) and is com-
prised of actors that can include public, private, and 
nonprofit actors (Koliba et  al. 2018; Rhodes 1997). 
Network architecture allows for the explicit identifica-
tion of actors as being linked or tied to other network 
actors. The functions carried out by the whole network, 
sub-network, or network cliques can include formal or 
informal processes of principled engagement, deliber-
ation, and decision-making. In essence, processes of col-
laboration unfold as interactions or exchanges between 
network actors. Network governance hinges on the ef-
ficacy of resource exchanges (Rhodes 1997) that lead to 
network outputs and performance (Turrini et al. 2009).
The multi-scale, multiplex water governance net-
work in the LCB contains a large number of actors who 
possess multiple objectives and engage with one an-
other through different types of ties (Koliba et al. 2014; 
Scheinert et al. 2015). The State of Vermont has flexi-
bility in the development and application of policies to 
meet Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) targets set 
by the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 
In this framework of “pragmatic federalism” (Gerlak 
2005), the state has considerable control over the shape 
of the collaborative governance response by choosing 
how it codifies requirements, structures (dis)incentives, 
and facilitates coordination. Figure  1 illustrates pos-
sible alternative configurations of the water governance 
network. In figure 1A, we show a traditional top-down, 
“non-collaborative” governance structure, where 
the State generates policy tools to directly manage or 
incent municipal behavior through mandates, grants, 
and matching funds. The edges in the network are 
formed by the legal requirements for clean water ac-
tions flowing from the State (S) to all municipalities 
(M), forming the basis of a typical hub and spoke or 
star network. This configuration represents the cur-
rent business-as-usual arrangement that involves an, 
essentially, formal, non-collaborative governance ar-
rangement. Vermont does not have strong county-level 
governance, making figure 1A the norm. In figure 1B, 
an alternative network structure describes regional 
water districts (D) that coordinates the involvement of 
municipalities and serves as an intermediary for regu-
lation and funding streams. In this instance, we can im-
agine a legal framework that mandates municipalities 
to participate in districts that collectively manage water 
quality into the regional jurisdictions, a scenario that 
was eventually enacted by the state. Within a district, 
total phosphorus (TP) mitigation efforts could be pri-
oritized at a regional scale, whereas municipal planning 
and implementation capacities could be pooled at the 
regional scale. Funding mechanisms (e.g., block grants) 
could further take advantage of the network to reduce 
the administrative burden on the state government 
and on specific municipalities. Such a configuration 
may create new inefficiencies in distributed govern-
ance and in principal-agent relationships. However, it 
may also surface local knowledge and develop social 
capital to better facilitate project feasibility. This scen-
ario best aligns with the externally directed type of col-
laborative governance regime outlined by Emerson and 
Nabatchi (2015). Finally, in figure 1C we see a hybrid 
of A & B, with some districts in place, but direct state-
municipal interactions also present. Such a structure 
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on a “self-initiated” collaborative governance regime 
(Emerson and Nabatchi 2015), in which the propensity 
of a municipality to voluntarily collaborate with others 
at the regional scale can vary.
Across these three scenarios, the State (S) serves as 
the central actor responsible for the distribution of 
resources across the network. As the network actor 
with the highest degree centrality, the resources of the 
state, both in terms of financial and human capacity, 
are critical to the overall performance of the network, 
regardless of its configuration. Municipalities (M) rely 
on state funds to pay in part for the planning and im-
plementation of stormwater projects. The two cap-
acities of human and financial capital are very often 
coupled—as it takes human resources to process re-
quests for funding, and limitations on funding will 
predicate the number of projects that may be planned 
and enacted. In essence, the resources available to the 
central actor in the collaborative governance network 
configurations studied here likely matters a great deal 
to the performance of the whole water governance net-
work. The degree to which the state’s human resource 
capacity limits or enables the flow of funding through 
each type of network is likely to matter a great deal.
To better understand how and to what extent col-
laborative governance arrangements work best and 
under what conditions, computer simulation modeling 
is increasingly being used to test and tune theory 
(Johnson 1999; Schlüter et al. 2017). Recently, the no-
tion of “collaborative platforms” has been advanced 
to answer the question of “how can collaborative 
governance be purposefully extended and scale-up?” 
(Ansell and Gash 2018, 16). Ansell and Gash propose 
the collaborative platform as a “generic organizational 
logic” (Ansell and Gash 2018, 17) or as a strategy for 
societal problem-solving (Nambisan and Baron 2009). 
These platforms can serve one of three different func-
tions: to explore and frame the nature of problems, 
to experiment with potential solutions, and then exe-
cute specific solutions using collaborative governance 
frameworks (Ansell and Gash 2018; Nambisan and 
Baron 2009). In promoting the concept of collaborative 
platforms, Ansell and Gash observe that “more needs 
to be done to translate the logic of platforms from the 
domain of technology, software development and even 
organization theory to that of governance and public 
administration” (Ansell and Gash 2018, 17). The use 
of computer simulation models to experiment with 
Figure 1. Alternative Network Configurations of Water Governance. In panel A, the state agency directly communicates requirements and 
funding to municipalities. In panel B, regional water districts act as intermediaries between state and municipal actors. In panel C, the 
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alternative collaborative designs is increasing, particu-
larly in the experimental stages of collaborative devel-
opment in which stakeholders may prototype and test 
the efficacy of these governance arrangements against 
performance targets. Although Ansell and Gash’s in-
terpretation of collaborative platforms extends well 
beyond the prototyping phase and into the realms of 
actual implementation, we focus here on one example 
of constructing and using a computer simulation 
model to test the efficacy of specific collaborative gov-
ernance arrangements. As we will note, stakeholder en-
gagement around the design of the model and the use 
of model output to initialize new collaborative govern-
ance arrangements (e.g., moving from experimentation 
to execution) is discussed. Borrowing from Ansell and 
Gash’s language, this experimental collaborative plat-
form can test a series of alternative design rules.
To better understand which design rules are more 
or less likely to be effective, we formulate a series of 
hypotheses to test in our model.
H1: The Collaborative Governance Hypothesis: 
Those alternative water governance arrangements that 
are premised on collaborative governance designs will 
generate higher nutrient load reductions than those 
water governance arrangements that are not prem-
ised on collaborative designs. Findings from prior 
studies of collective action problems for water gov-
ernance have found that greater coordination among 
governance actors leads to more effective outcomes, 
underscoring the assumptions of collaborative gov-
ernance regime theory that collaborative governance 
leads to better outcomes (Koontz and Johnson 2004; 
Scott 2015). However, other studies have found that 
collaboration can sometimes reinforce existing power 
relations (Scott and Thomas 2017) and lead to reduced 
effectiveness. Our first hypothesis centers on whether 
collaboration leads to greater phosphorus mitigation. 
We postulate that greater rates of municipal collabor-
ation in water districts will lead to greater phosphorus 
mitigation.
H2: The Collaboration for Planning and 
Implementation Hypothesis (H2). Collaboration in 
both the planning and implementation phases of pro-
ject development will result in higher nutrient load 
reductions than those networks that only collaborate 
around the planning of projects. Our second hypoth-
esis focuses on the functional goals of collaboration. 
In the realm of municipal stormwater management, 
clean water projects, like all engineering or capital 
improvement projects, must follow a clear planning-
to-implementation, “end-to-end” process. Planning 
phases include the scoping and design of potential pro-
jects and involve the coordination of engineering firms, 
public works departments, and planning offices. While 
the implementation phase of stormwater projects can 
include that same group as well as private contractors. 
We expect that water districts that regionalize both 
project planning and implementation will be more ef-
fective than districts that only regionalize planning. In 
other words, extending the value proposition of col-
laboration from an “end-to-end” perspective is likely 
to better amplify the positive impacts of collaborative 
governance on performance.
H3: The Mandated Collaboration Hypothesis. 
Mandated collaborations for planning, and for plan-
ning and implementation will generate higher nutrient 
load reductions than voluntary collaboration for plan-
ning, and for planning and implementation. The results 
of studies of mandated, externally directed collabor-
ation have provided mixed results relative to the value 
and efficacy of mandated collaboration. A comparative 
case study of mandated health care delivery networks 
by Rodriguez et al. (2007) found the mandated collab-
orative approach failed to enhance interorganizational 
relationships, particularly in cases when there is a lack 
of multiple governance mechanisms to enable well-
resourced coordination. While Brummel et al.’s (2012) 
study of wildland fire planning found that mandated 
collaboration among service providers provided more 
consistent and higher quality services because of the 
ability to allow for flexibility and resource sharing. It 
is clear that the specific design of the mandated col-
laboration is critically important. We anticipate that 
mandated collaboration will allow for lower capacity 
municipalities responsible for higher nutrient loads 
to receive aid in their phosphorus mitigation efforts. 
thereby increasing the impact of mandated collabor-
ation arrangements. The challenges associated with the 
limited capacity of particularly smaller municipalities 
are a clear concern to emerge during discussions with 
local municipal leaders.
H4: The Administrative Bottleneck Hypothesis. 
The administrative capacity of the State (S) will be a 
significant factor in load reductions results of all con-
figurations of water governance design considered 
here. Drawing on qualitative assertions made by pol-
icymakers operating in the region, as well as the logic 
of coupling of financial and human resources, the ad-
ministrative capacity of the State (S) to evaluate water 
quality projects operates as a constraint on the alloca-
tion of resource. This assertion is supported by prior 
studies of regional governance that have found that the 
flow of financial resources to infrastructure projects is 
hindered by a lack of administrative capacity to scope, 
design, and implement projects (Milio 2007).
Case Study: Stormwater Project Planning and 
Implementation in the Lake Champlain Basin
The wicked problem of nonpoint pollution provides a 
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institutional designs and specific outcomes, in this 
case, reductions in nutrient loads. In the LCB in the 
northeastern United States, challenges of nutrient pol-
lution and harmful cyanobacteria blooms in Lake 
Champlain are met by a variety of cooperating and 
competing governance actors that operate at federal, 
state, regional, municipal, and even international levels 
(figure 2B). Collectively, these actors comprise multi-
scale, multiplex water governance networks (Koliba 
et al. 2018; Lubell, Robins, and Wang 2014; Scheinert 
et al. 2015; 2017). It is well-recognized that the multi-
and-cross-scale nature of environmental problems—
including water-related issues of quantity, quality, and 
the degradation of concomitant ecosystem services—
requires governance approaches that themselves span 
similar scales (Bodin, Sandström, and Crona 2017; 
Hamilton and Lubell 2018; Koontz et al. 2010; Pahl-
Wostl et al. 2010; Scott and Thomas 2017). Yet, under-
standing how the actors in water governance networks 
might react and adapt to novel policy or environmental 
pressures (e.g., regulations, global climate change) re-
quires dynamic modeling techniques that integrate 
geographic context, spatial and temporal lags, and the 
complex structure of the social-ecological network.
Harmful cyanobacteria blooms (sometimes grouped 
with harmful algal blooms, or HABs) are a significant 
water quality problem in Lake Champlain and many 
other freshwater lakes all over the world. HABs close 
beaches, threaten public health, negatively impact re-
gional economies, and reduce property values (USEPA 
2018). In Lake Champlain, HABs occur most fre-
quently during late summer in shallow bays where cli-
mate has a greater influence on nutrient mixing and 
bacteria have easier access to nutrients in lake sedi-
ment (Isles et al. 2017; Zia et al. 2016). Blooms in Lake 
Champlain are fed by nutrient nonpoint runoff (pri-
marily phosphorus) from multiple sources, including 
agriculture, urban stormwater, streambank erosion, 
and forested land use (Lake Champlain Basin Program 
2018). Each nutrient source represents a potential 
target for policy tools aimed (directly or indirectly) 
at reducing nutrient runoff, and ultimately bloom se-
verity and frequency.
A TMDL regulation, put in place by the USEPA, cur-
rently regulates the maximum amount of phosphorus 
that is allowed to reach Lake Champlain and still meet 
water quality standards. The amount of phosphorus 
reaching a waterbody is termed “load” and is meas-
ured in units of mass per time (e.g., kg/day, Mt/year) 
(figure 2A). Thus, the TMDL does not directly regu-
late the presence of HABs in Lake Champlain, but ra-
ther one of the main causal inputs (Koliba et al. 2014). 
Figure 2. One View of the LCB Water Governance System. Panel A shows the spatial distribution of TP loads at the NHDPlus catchment 
scale. Panel B shows the mismatch between hydrology (broadly represented by HUC-8 watersheds), municipal jurisdictions, and the 
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USEPA used a physics-based SWAT (Soil and Water 
Assessment Tool) model (Arnold and Fohrer 2005) 
combining land use, hydrological, and erosional pro-
cesses to estimate the contribution of various land 
uses in a spatially explicit manner across the LCB 
(figure 2A).
On June 15, 2015, Act 64, colloquially the “Vermont 
Clean Water Act,” was signed into law to address 
degrading water quality in Lake Champlain and its 
tributaries. The law set forth new rules for managing 
water quality in the state, including restrictions on 
agricultural practices and permitting processes for ex-
isting and new development. It created the Clean Water 
Fund, a pool of financial resources to be distributed by 
the state to fund projects related to clean water goals. 
Subsequently, on June 6, 2018, Act 76 was signed into 
law outlining the expectations to design and implement 
a system through which every watershed in the LCB 
be assigned a Clean Water Service Provider (CWSP) 
to provide regional coordination of non-regulatory 
water quality improvement projects (Vermont General 
Assembly 2019). These new CWSPs would coordinate 
actions to collectively develop clean water priorities 
and to apply for state funding. While implementa-
tion details are not yet finalized, this collaborative 
governance arrangement is in part due to the findings 
stemming from the sharing of these modeling results.
Agent-Based Modeling of Water Governance
ABMs have been proven to be useful tools as experi-
mental collaborative platforms that can help policy-
makers make informed decisions (Ligmann-Zielinska 
and Jankowski 2007). ABMs are a “bottom-up” 
method of simulating the interactions among heter-
ogenous actors and their environment, commonly in 
a spatially explicit manner. Agent-based modeling has 
been called “the only technique available today to for-
malize models based on micro-foundations, such as 
agents’ beliefs and behavior and social interactions, all 
aspects that we know are of a certain importance to 
understand macro outcomes” (Squazzoni and Boero 
2010). ABMs often reflect the dynamics in real-world 
systems, including how system structures change due 
to internal processes or outside disturbances (Batty 
et al. 2011). One strength of ABMs lies in their ability 
to simulate emergent system-scale dynamics from the 
repeat interactions of individual agents on a landscape 
(Parker et al. 2003). Through the application of rela-
tively simple rules that govern individual agent be-
havior, patterns of collective group behavior, including 
cooperation in environmental management, can 
emerge (Goldstone and Janssen 2005; Scott, Thomas, 
and Magallanes 2018). This ability to link multi-scale 
actors, processes, and structures means ABMs are 
particularly well-suited to the study of resilience and 
sustainability in complex social-ecological systems 
(Bitterman and Bennett 2018). For example, ABMs 
have been used to study land use change in the Yucatán 
peninsula (Manson 2005), the movement of elk as af-
fected by land management practices in Yellowstone 
National Park (Bennett and McGinnis 2008), the 
transmission of disease across livestock production 
chains (Wiltshire et  al. 2019), and in common pool 
resource management situations (Deadman 1999; 
Schlüter and Pahl-Wostl 2007). ABMs have been expli-
citly used to model alternative institutional designs in 
other settings including models of hazardous waste re-
mediation (Eckerd, Campbell, and Kim 2012), school 
district governance (Maroulis 2016), the diffusion of 
fraudulent claims across service delivery networks 
(Kim 2007), and the prioritization of transportation 
projects (Zia and Koliba 2013).
In their work on Balinese water temples, Lansing and 
Kremer (1993) demonstrated how simulation models 
could be used to understand the relationship between 
water resources and collaborative governance. Their 
work showed how self-organization emerged in spe-
cific collaborative governance arrangements. Building 
on this legacy, a suite of models and research programs 
have emerged at this nexus of water, land use, col-
lective decision-making, and governance. Schluter and 
Pahl-Wostl (2007) developed an ABM to simulate the 
resilience of different water-management institutions 
to changes in environmental conditions in a semi-arid 
Amu Darya river basin in Central Asia. Smajgl et al. 
(2009) used an ABM to simulate water trading mar-
kets and alternative market configurations in Australia, 
whereas Bellaubi and Pahl-Wostl (2017) modeled cor-
ruption in a water management system in Kenya and 
Ghana. While governance actors can be modeled as 
agents, their internal dynamics can have substantial 
influence on collective and individual decision-making 
as well, as illustrated by the ABM in Watkins et  al. 
(2013). Recent communications behavior-focused re-
search has also shown how ABMs can be used to test 
behavioral theories (Janssen and Baggio 2017; Bucini 
et al. 2019) and how different policy-targeting can im-
pact flood mitigation and coping (Erdlenbruch and 
Bonté 2018). In many cases, ABMs are calibrated to 
historical patterns (e.g., land use, migration) (Grimm 
2005; Magliocca and Ellis 2013) such that the model 
can be used to create scenarios of future system trajec-
tories. When calibration targets are sparse or unavail-
able, or when the subject of the study is novel, ABMs 
are commonly more “stylized” and used not for pre-
diction, but to improve understanding of system dy-
namics. In this study, the alternative water governance 
regime embodied by districts in Vermont would be 
novel to this system. Thus our ABM is conceived as a 
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governance theory and not subject to model valid-
ation expectations. We purposefully simplify agent 
decision-making process and have not, for example, in-
cluded political or legal motivations of behavior. Given 
these assumptions, the simulations explore model sen-
sitivity to policy-relevant inputs.
While the above models capture many of the key 
dynamics that can be found in watershed governance, 
a gap remains in modeling the translation of policy 
objectives to policy tools in a manner that is both 
spatially explicit and incorporates environmental feed-
backs. Effective reduction of nonpoint pollution has 
proven to be extremely difficult. The extent to which 
these difficulties stem from challenges associated with 
the design and operation of explicit water governance 
networks is the subject of this study.
Materials and Methods
An adaptive management perspective guided the devel-
opment of this governance ABM (Norton 2005), with 
a key feature of this approach being the pursuit of col-
laborative learning between social and natural scien-
tists and policymakers and other stakeholders (Daniels 
and Walker 2001). At the start of this project, the re-
search team undertook a series of focus groups and 
interviews with key informants in the LCB, and source 
document analysis of major pieces of legislation, rules, 
white papers, and TMDL memorandums of under-
standing. This phase of research was used to develop 
a qualitative appreciation of the multi-level govern-
ance networks operating in this region. A Policy and 
Technical Advisory Committee (PTAC) met with the 
research team at regular intervals to inform the model 
development. Observations about model assumptions, 
data sources, and intended uses of model outputs were 
made, summarized and drawn on by the research team. 
Additional data were collected through a survey that 
went out to all municipalities across the State (Clark, 
Hurley, and Koliba 2018).
As detailed in figure  3, the coupled (connected) 
model platform has three primary components: (1) a 
land use model that places municipal stormwater pro-
jects on the LCB landscape, (2) a simplified load accu-
mulation model, and (3) the ABM of networked water 
governance. Communication among model compo-
nents is facilitated by an infrastructure that tightly 
couples the models at an annual timescale, meaning 
that the land use, phosphorus load, and governance 
models can generate outputs that can be aggregated 
across specific and consistent scales of temporality.
Within the ABM, agent–agent interactions occur at 
sub-annual intervals. Agent–environment interactions 
occur when municipalities or districts react to the state 
of the environment and make decisions that lead to the 
creation of stormwater projects, which are then instan-
tiated on the simulated landscape. When implemented, 
these projects differentially affect annualized phos-
phorus loads that accumulate to the lake. The changes 
in loadings are read by the governance actor agents, 
affecting their behavior in future timesteps and closing 
the environment-agent portion of the feedback loop. In 
addition to the modeling framework shown in figure 3, 
the Overview Design Concepts, and Details (ODD) 
model specification (Grimm et al. 2010) for the ABM 
is included in the Supplementary Material. The ABM 
framework is built upon the MASON Multiagent 
Simulation Toolkit (Luke et al. 2005) and its extension 
GeoMason, which provides additional geospatial sup-
port capabilities.
Together, the ABM, land use, and load accumulation 
models trace the lifecycle of clean water projects as they 
proceed from an initial state of unknown/unplanned to 
a final state where the project is implemented on the 
Figure 3. Generalized Schematic of the Coupled Model. The Coupler is a software architecture that facilitates communication among 
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landscape. When municipalities utilize their project-
planning capacity, they may coordinate with other 
actors to prioritize clean water projects according to 
their individual characteristics (e.g., available capacity) 
and rules put in place by policy. The state agency agent 
evaluates and prioritizes projects, allocating funds and 
utilizing its state-level capacity. Finally, agents imple-
ment projects “on the ground,” affecting land use and 
fulfilling the lifecycle of a project. Once agents imple-
ment clean water projects, these changes to the land-
scape are then translated to the environmental model, 
affecting the amount of phosphorus reaching Lake 
Champlain.
The ABM simulates the interactions among three 
agent types: municipalities (i.e., towns and cities), re-
gional water district agents, and state agencies in the 
LCB. Each municipal agent represents one of the 126 
Vermont towns or cities whose centroid falls within 
the Vermont portion of the LCB. Eight regional water 
district agents each correspond to actual regional plan-
ning district (RPC) boundaries, with each municipal 
agent assigned to its corresponding geographic region. 
Due to our focus on the CWIP process, we simplify 
interactions among multiple government agencies by 
using a singular state agency agent that is tasked with 
improving water quality and managing the allocation 
of public funds. Within each annual timestep, muni-
cipal agents may: (1) plan clean water projects, (2) 
prioritize projects, and (3) implement projects. When 
undertaking each of these steps, real-world muni-
cipalities are subject to dynamic budget and staffing 
constraints, regulatory requirements, and public will. 
We have simplified municipal decision-making and re-
source constraints to five key municipal variables and 
functions (table 1).
The objective of a municipal agent is to reduce 
the amount of phosphorus load generated by land 
use within its borders to the target level specified by 
the “reasonable assurance” scenario generated by the 
USEPA during the TMDL process (US Environmental 
Protection Agency 2016). A municipal agent’s planning 
capacity corresponds to the number of projects they 
can take from concept to a “shovel ready” state that is 
ready to be funded. The distribution of municipal plan-
ning and implementation capacity parameters were es-
timated using empirical data from the VTANR CWIP 
database. We estimated each municipality’s implemen-
tation capacity by calculating the annual mean number 
of projects it completed over the last 4 years (the length 
of the dataset). As data for planned, but not funded, 
projects are currently unavailable, we assume that 
planning capacity is twice that of implementation cap-
acity. Additional parameter estimation details can be 
found in the supplemental ODD protocol. Municipal 
agents randomly select among unplanned projects in 
their boundaries, representing the (at times) disordered 
process of managing multiple priorities from various 
constituencies and interest groups. Agents then use 
their planning capacity to “discover” properties of the 
project (e.g., estimated load reduction potential, esti-
mated implementation cost, location) in a simulated 
planning process. Municipal agents then rank planned 
projects according to prioritization criteria. We follow 
a simplifying assumption that municipal agents seek to 
maximize utility by prioritizing projects that provide 
the greatest load reductions per dollar. All municipal 
agents follow this institutional rule logic, maximizing 








Once projects are planned, they are passed to the state 
agency agent to be ranked and funded (see below), 
then passed back to their corresponding municipality. 
Unfunded projects are queued, and funded projects are 
available for implementation. Municipal agents then 
rank funded projects according to equation (1), again 
optimizing for load reductions per dollar. The top n 
projects are then implemented, where n corresponds to 
an agent’s implementation capacity. Projects that are 
Table 1. Variables and Functions Governing Behavior of Municipal Agents
Variable Description Range
Planning capacity The number of clean water projects a municipality can plan in a year. 2–14
Implementation 
capacity
The number of clean water projects a municipality can implement in a year. 1–6
TMDL load 
reduction target
Target value of phosphorus load reduction for urban land use in the municipality to meet 




The probability that a municipality will collaborate with other municipalities in regional water 
districts. Empirical distributions generated using survey data of municipalities in the Lake 
Champlain Basin.
0–1
Prioritization criteria The algorithm used by municipal agents to rank projects prior to submitting them for funding 
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funded but not implemented are returned to the cor-
responding municipal agent’s implementation queue. 
Once municipal agents have met their phosphorus re-
duction targets, they stop all activity.
In some scenarios (described below), state policy 
is altered to mandate collaboration among muni-
cipal agents at a regional scale. Stakeholder anecdotes 
drawn from focus groups suggest that regional co-
operation varies greatly among regions and their con-
stituent municipalities. This is confirmed by a 2017 
survey of Vermont municipalities (Clark, Hurley, and 
Koliba 2018) that drew on responses to determine the 
probability that a municipality will collaborate with 
their regional planning commission (RPC) along four 
dimensions: (1) information sharing, (2) technical as-
sistance, (3) sharing human/physical assets, and (4) 
receipt of monetary support. This survey was sent to 
all 249 municipalities in Vermont, with a response rate 
of 55% across Vermont, and 64% of those munici-
palities in the LCB. Each municipality’s response was 
coded 1/0 for yes/no, then summed to estimate a “co-
ordination capacity score” for each municipality. An 
empirical distribution was generated for each region. 
At the state scale, these scores follow a normal distri-
bution, though distributions vary at the regional scale. 
Accordingly, we estimate the distribution for each re-
gion in the simulation and normalize to the interval 
[0,1]. In those scenarios where policies allow for re-
gional coordination, we sample from these distribu-
tions and assign a probability of collaboration for each 
municipality. Mean values are shown in table 2.
At the state level, the responsibility of water policy-
rulemaking primarily falls on the state Vermont 
Division of Environmental Conservation (DEC). 
Accordingly, we model a second agent type repre-
senting a state agency tasked with managing water 
quality. This singleton agency agent takes allocated 
funds, evaluates municipal projects, and ranks funding 
priorities as specified by policy scenarios. The state 
agent prioritizes projects using the same efficiency 
criteria from equation (1). This agent’s capacity to 
evaluate projects is a scenario-driven parameter and 
corresponds to its throughput, or the number of pro-
jects it can evaluate in an annual timestep. Finally, the 
state agent sets the rules of the CWIP action arena, 
thereby affecting the allowed behavior of municipal 
and regional agents (table 3). The final class of agents 
is regional facilitators that, depending on policy scen-
ario, coordinate the planning and implementation of 
municipal agents at broader scales. We model these 
agents on RPCs and utilities, but the framework can 
be scaled to other geographic extents (e.g., watershed 
boundaries) or network configurations.
The land use model provides a bridge between gov-
ernance actions and water quality impacts. This con-
nection takes the form of the clean water projects that 
are planned, prioritized, funded, and implemented by 
municipalities in the LCB. While each municipality is 
itself a governance actor in the ABM, each is also con-
nected to a spatial feature corresponding to its muni-
cipal boundaries. Empirical data from VTANR were 
used to generate a realistic set of possible projects for 
the simulation. Additional detail can be found in S7.2 
of the Supplementary Appendix.
The environmental model is a simplified load accu-
mulation model based on an EPA-created SWAT model 
(Arnold and Fohrer 2005; Gassman et al. 2007) that 
calculated average annual phosphorus contributions 
to Lake Champlain (US Environmental Protection 
Agency 2016). As projects are implemented on the 
landscape, the contribution of phosphorus to the lake 
is reduced in a spatially explicit manner. This simplified 
model excludes nutrient transport and the role of cli-
mate and assumes all phosphorus eventually reaches 
the lake. The resultant model is a simplified represen-
tation of nutrient export from the landscape (S7.1 of 
the Supplementary Appendix). However, the relative 
lack of complexity reduces computational overhead 
while isolating the effects of governance dynamics on 
the landscape.
Through collaboration with policymakers at state, 
regional, and municipal scales, we identified a set of 
scenarios that included alternative policy configur-
ations, state-level capacity, and funding allocations to 
explore via simulation. The scenarios that alter policy 
rules (table 3) modify the degree and geographic scale of 
cooperation among municipal and regional water dis-
trict agents. In the current state of this social-ecological 
system, municipalities are statutorily required to in-
dividually meet regulatory and non-regulatory load 
reductions and must participate in clean water im-
provements, but have a choice as to whether work dir-
ectly with the state (figure 1A) or engaged in mandated 
collaboration with other municipalities in their region 
to form a district (figure 1B). This second scenario also 











Note: Regions derived from Regional Planning Commission 










ont user on 12 M
arch 2021
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2020, Vol. 30, No. 4646
regionalizes planning capacity but imagines a policy 
tool that mandates municipal participation (prob-
ability of coordination = 1). A third scenario is posited 
in which municipal agents have chosen to voluntarily 
cooperate with others in the region or not (figure 1C). 
The voluntary participation of municipalities is prob-
abilistic, according to table  2. The fourth and fifth 
scenarios extend the previous scenarios to also include 
collaboration for project implementation. Again, vol-
untary and mandated policies allow for different levels 
of participation. These scenarios approximate a re-
gional utility authorized to regulate the municipalities 
in its jurisdiction. In some scenarios, collaboration is 
mandated by the state agent, and regional facilitators 
manage all municipal planning and implementation in 
their jurisdiction.
In addition to alternative policy scenarios, we 
modify the capacity (financial and human resources) 
of the state agency agent to evaluate and allocate funds 
to stormwater projects (table  3). The State is tasked 
with evaluating and prioritizing the projects identified 
by municipalities. Administrative capacity bottlenecks 
may emerge at the project evaluation stage because the 
State retains approval of all projects. A constrained ad-
ministrative capacity can limit the throughput of the 
approval and funding to municipalities leading to re-
duced load reductions on the landscape. Further, as 
Acts 64 and 76 are implemented and as state, regional, 
and local capacities come online, there is uncertainty 
in the amount of funds that should be optimally allo-
cated to the problem. At a most basic level, if funding 
is low, loads will likely remain high. However, if too 
much money is allocated and there is insufficient 
capacity to implement projects, the funds sit unused. 
In our scenarios, we alter the throughput of the state 
agent and the overall fund allocation to explore these 
dynamics. The parameters are based on past project 
funding data and were developed in consultation 
with agency stakeholders. In total, we simulate 1,225 
scenarios. Model stochasticity is introduced in (1) the 
generation of projects, (2) the selection of projects by 
municipalities to plan, (3) municipal participation in 
regional cooperation, and (4) the initialization of mu-
nicipal capacity. A simulation runs for 50 model years, 
and each scenario was repeated for 30 Monte Carlo 
iterations.
Results
Hypothesis 1, the Collaborative Governance 
Hypothesis, and hypothesis 2, the Collaboration for 
Planning and Implementation Hypothesis, are closely 
related. We expect collaborative policies to perform 
better than non-collaborative policies, and we further 
expect that collaboration across several stages of pro-
ject planning and implementation will perform better 
than partial efforts. We first compare the overall effi-
cacy of the different collaborative governance design 
scenarios by comparing the cumulative load reductions 
for each scenario over the full simulation period. As 
shown in figure  4, the most effective (highest cumu-
lative reduction) design was the creation of mandated 
planning and implementation districts. The voluntary 
planning and implementation districts perform nearly 
as well, followed by act alone, mandated planning 
(only), and voluntary planning (only) districts in that 
Table 3. Scenario Parameters Include Coordination Policies (District Function), Resource Levels (Funding and 
Capacity), and Landscape Configuration
Resource Parameters
Parameter Values
Allocated funds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 million USD
State agent capacity (throughput) 50, 75, 100, 125, 150, 200 and 225 projects/year
Initial landscape configuration 5 alternative distributions of projects on landscape
Coordination policy 1. No district  
2. Voluntary planning district  
3. Mandated planning district  
4. Voluntary planning and implementation district  
5. Mandated planning and implementation district
Coordination policies
Water district function Municipal aggregation rule Aggregated planning? Aggregated 
implementation?
No district none no no
Voluntary planning district probability-based optional no
Mandated planning district all in region yes no
Voluntary implementation and planning district probability-based optional optional
Mandated implementation and planning district all in region yes yes
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order. The difference among outcomes was confirmed 
to be significant by a Kruskal-Wallis test (p < .001). 
The clustering of outcomes shown in figure 5A is a re-
sult of multiple scenarios with similar levels of funding 
and state-level capacity. However, statistically signifi-
cant differences (p < .001) among collaborative gov-
ernance scenarios hold when controlling for funding 
and capacity. In figures 4B and 4C, we see how differ-
ences in policy efficacy change as funding and capacity 
are increased. There is little difference among policy 
outcomes at low resource levels, whereas disparities 
become evident as resources increase.
While these findings partially confirm H1, our re-
sults are mixed with respect to the lower efficacy in 
policies that incentivize regionalized planning schemes. 
Collaborative arrangements only sometimes lead to 
greater load reductions, specifically when resources are 
relatively high, and both planning and implementa-
tion capacity are shared. Additional analysis confirms 
three-way interactions among policy, funding, and cap-
acity scenario parameters (table 4).
The mixed findings of H1 are relevant for evaluating 
the Collaboration for Planning and Implementation 
Hypothesis. Our findings very clearly prove H2—the 
coupling of collaboration for planning and implementa-
tion—leads to more efficacious outcomes. In our simu-
lations, municipal water districts that only collaborate 
around planning functions are the least effective (as 
measured by cumulative load reductions) collaborative 
governance scenarios. These results are explained by a 
spatial mismatch between planning and implementa-
tion capacities caused by the newly enabled structure 
Figure 4. Box-and-Whisker Plots of Cumulative Load Reductions. Panel A shows all scenarios by policy, obscuring the differences among 
policies at various funding and capacity levels. Panel B shows little differences among policies at low capacity and funding levels, whereas 
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of the water districts. Because planning capacity is re-
gionalized at the district level, but implementation cap-
acity is not, projects can be identified and planned in 
areas where there is insufficient ability to implement 
them. Essentially, municipalities can become “over-
planned” when the number of to-be-implemented pro-
jects exceeds a municipality’s implementation capacity. 
The regionalization policy creates a new bottleneck at 
the implementation stage. We measure the depth of this 
backlog using the average number of projects that have 
been planned and funded—but not implemented—for 
each collaborative governance scenario.
The municipal-scale bottleneck becomes increas-
ingly apparent in scenarios with greater state-level 
capacity (table  5). As the state processes additional 
projects, municipal capacity is exhausted, and the 
Figure 5. Load Reductions as a Function of Policy, Funding, and Capacity Scenarios. Response is generally nonlinear, as the amount of 
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implementation backlog increases. The backlog of de-
layed projects is much larger (confirmed by analysis of 
variance [ANOVA], p < .001) when planning capacity 
is regionalized separate from implementation capacity, 
resulting in lower efficiency in the planning-only re-
gionalization scenarios. The issue is exacerbated as 
capacity (throughput) of the state agency agent in-
creases. Here, planning capacity, implementation cap-
acity, and prioritized policy targets (greater required 
load reductions) are mismatched spatially and tempor-
ally. Therefore, the regionalization hypothesis is sup-
ported only when that mismatch is reduced.
Hypothesis 3, the Mandated Collaboration 
Hypothesis, tests how municipalities with low op-
erational capacity but high TP loads are affected by 
an externally initiated mandate to collaborate. To test 
this case, we created a subset of municipal agents pos-
sessing both low capacity (implementation capacity ≤ 
1) and the highest 20% of TP loads. Given the imple-
mentation bottlenecks discussed above and illustrated 
in table 5, we only tested differences between the man-
dated and voluntary planning-and-implementation 
policies. In the mandated policy, we expect that in 
aggregate the mitigated loads will be greater, as mu-
nicipal agents with greater capacity can “lend” their 
resources to low-capacity collaborators. Accordingly, 
we performed the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis ana-
lysis of variance of each group individually, reported 
in table 6. This Table should be read as what percent 
more effective is the mandated policy in mitigating TP 
loads than the voluntary policy? We find that in all 
cases, the mandated policy performs better among the 
low-capacity, high-loads municipalities (all compari-
sons significant at p =  .01). The relative effectiveness 
of the mandated policy does not always improve as 
state-level resources increase. This is sensible given that 
the prioritization schemes in both policies optimize for 
load mitigation independent of resource constraints. 
To confirm our findings, we also compared policy man-
dates among municipal agents with low-capacity and 
low TP loads (not shown here). In this alternative case, 
the result was the opposite, as the voluntary policy 
performed better (Kruskal-Wallis test, p  =  .01). This 
is also as expected, as low-load areas are disfavored in 
a collaborative scheme, independent of local capacity. 
Thus, those municipalities with relatively low TP loads 
can improve their local conditions by not collaborating 
under a voluntary policy regime.
Our fourth hypothesis, the Administrative 
Bottleneck Hypothesis, tests whether the human re-
source capacity at the state scale (as indicated by 
the number of projects that State administrators can 
Table 4. Analysis of Variance of Interactions Among Model Input Parameters
df Sum Sq. Mean Sq. F p (>F)
Policy 4 1.5e11 3.6e10 40,214.9 <.001
State-level capacity 1 3.7e11 3.7e11 413,945.0 <.001
Funding 1 1.2e10 1.2e10 13,168.5 <.001
Policy:Capacity 4 4.3e10 1.1e10 11,972.6 <.001
Policy:Funding 4 2.3e9 5.7e8 628.6 <.001
Capacity:Funding 1 1.4e10 1.4e10 15,584.4 <.001
Policy:Capacity:Funding 4 2.9e9 7.1e8 792.9 <.001
Table 5. Project Implementation Backlogs, Measured as the Mean Number of Projects that are Funded but Unable 
to be Completed due to Constraints on Implementation Capacity
State Agency Evaluation Capacity
 50 75 100 125 150 200 225
Policy 
scenario 




















































1 (0.00) 1 (0.00) 1 (0.00) 1 (0.00) 1 (0.00) 1 (0.00) 1 
(0.00)
Note: SDs in parentheses. Differences among regionalization policy, state evaluation capacity, and funding levels (not shown here) confirmed 
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process) constrains the efficacy of the program and the 
allocation of funds. When measured using the cumula-
tive load reductions funded by alternative collabora-
tive governance scenarios, we find this to be the case. 
Interactions among policy, capacity, and funding were 
confirmed by the ANOVA results (table  5). We plot 
these interactions among policy, capacity, funding, and 
load reductions in figure 5. Load reductions in all col-
laborative governance scenarios exhibit some degree 
of non-linear response, as indicated by the surfaces on 
the left-hand side of the figure. In general, when the 
state’s human resource capacity to evaluate projects 
is relatively low (less than 100 projects/year) the ef-
fects of additional funds are minimal. For example, in 
scenarios that model a voluntary planning district with 
a capacity of 100 projects/year, our model indicates 
that that increasing funding from 1 to 7 million dollars 
will result in little-to-no change in load reductions. As 
capacity increases, however, additional funds do lead 
to greater TP load reductions. The locations of thresh-
olds differ by active policy but are generally found in 
the 100–150 projects/year range in this model. The 
response surface for planning-only districts is fairly 
flat, indicating a less-responsive system. Planning-and-
implementation districts, on the other hand, respond 
more strongly to changes in capacity and clean water 
funding. The “act alone” scenarios fall in between. The 
relationships among load reductions, funding, and 
state capacity support the bottleneck hypothesis.
Finally, we can also explore the suite of options 
available to policymakers from the perspective of 
overall “bottom-line” performance indicators. As we 
have shown, load reductions respond strongly to state-
level capacity. A likely question within VTANR may be 
“what is the right level of staffing (capacity), and how 
might we measure the effectiveness of our actions?” In 
figure 6, we plot two alternative metrics for planning-
and-implementation districts against various levels of 
state capacity. In Panel A, we see that as human re-
source capacity to evaluate projects increases, so does 
a performance metric based on the total kilograms of 
phosphorus mitigated. However, we also see in Panel B 
that as capacity increases, the effectiveness of spending 
(kg / $1,000) decreases. This is a result of the priori-
tization process—as the governance network imple-
ments additional clean water projects, it necessarily 
funds more marginal projects, shifting the distribution 
and lowering return on investment.
Discussion
Our model findings generally support the supposition 
that designing for collaborative governance leads to 
better performance outcomes in the form of reduced 
phosphorus loads, affirming H1. We also find that H2, 
the Collaboration for Planning and Implementation 
Hypothesis to be affirmed, as well as the Mandated 
Collaboration Hypothesis (H3). These findings are 
likely intuitive in cases where all capacities and object-
ives are aggregated, and processes are optimized using 
collaborative governance mechanisms and norms. In 
these scenarios, the policy essentially structures the 
collaborative governance regime as a scale-based linear 
optimization that maximizes utility at a broader scale. 
While a useful benchmark, this type of governance re-
quires the participation of all finer-scale entities (here, 
municipalities) that is only achieved through man-
dated collaboration. These results also support the 
Administrative Bottleneck Hypothesis (H4) in which 
we see the value of matching the administrative cap-
acity of the State to levels of funding.
As the real-world policy reality deviates from a 
mathematically optimal configuration, the resultant 
social and environmental outcomes are less predict-
able. For example, voluntary participation scenarios 
led to lower reductions in load reductions and less-
efficient spending of funds. Further, new bottlenecks 
and project backlogs were created by planning-only 
districts at the municipal level, again leading to less-
efficient performance. We can conclude, therefore, that 
the system is not strictly dependent on scaling effects—
rather, collaborative design considerations of how and 
Table 6. The Relative Performance of The Mandated Planning-and-Implementation Policy Over the Voluntary Policy
State-Level Capacity (Projects/Year)
50 75 100 125 150 200 225
Annual funding (in millions of dollars) 1 22.9 13.4 13.9 23.1 23.2 23.3 22.5
2 22.7 20.2 19.3 26.6 27.8 20.5 24.1
3 18.5 22.0 20.7 21.8 23.8 31.5 22.5
4 20.5 19.3 24.9 20.5 18.5 15.2 33.6
5 23.5 15.6 23.1 23.4 22.2 31.7 29.0
6 17.2 23.8 19.8 18.0 26.1 24.2 35.5
7 11.2 13.3 11.2 20.6 20.4 21.2 37.4
Note: Values in the table are percentages, and should be read, for example, as “the mandated policy on average mitigates 22.9% more load 
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where to regionalize governance capacity is important 
in achieving goals as well.
These findings demonstrate the complex trade-offs 
that can surface when collaborative governance mech-
anisms are employed. Collaboration for collaboration’s 
sake is not a panacea. Our model results demonstrate 
that the links between planning and implementation, 
and the need for administrative capacity to address 
bottlenecks are critically important considerations.
Our model indicates that the efficacy of instituting 
a collaborative governance approach to municipal 
stormwater management is highly dependent on the 
capacity of the state agency agent to evaluate clean 
water projects and allocate funds. The parameter 
ranges for our scenarios are based on empirical data 
from the Vermont DEC clean water projects data-
base, which shows that approximately 57 urban land 
use projects are funded annually (VTDEC 2019). Our 
simulations show that significant increases in state cap-
acity will have greater immediate impacts than short-
term increases in funding. As shown in figure 6, system 
response to an increase in capacity is non-linear. Across 
all modeled scenarios, at lower capacity levels (100 
projects/year or less), funding can increase by 700% 
and the response of the policy target (i.e., load reduc-
tions) remains flat, as the system cannot utilize all of 
the funding from the state. Though increased capacity 
and funding improve the state’s ability to process pro-
jects, this model holds municipal (and regional) cap-
acity constant. Thus, additional resources eventually 
shift a bottleneck from the state agent to the munici-
palities (or to their regionalized districts). The values 
in figure 6 heatmaps point to possible “sweet spots,” 
or combinations of capacity and funding levels that 
could lead to more efficient policy outcomes. While 
the assumptions and simplifications in the model limit 
normative predictions, the model allows for the explor-
ation of alternative scenarios with stakeholder input.
The ability of the water governance ABM to both 
test hypotheses and provide some practical consid-
erations to policymakers offers us a unique ability to 
test variations of collaborative governance theory. This 
study contributes to the growing body of research that 
has demonstrated the efficacy of collaborative govern-
ance arrangements to address wicked environmental 
problems (Booher 2004; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; 
Koontz and Johnson 2004; Pahl-Wostl et  al. 2007; 
Scott 2015). This assertion is rendered at a coarse-grain 
level, as found in Hypothesis 1. The variation of differ-
ences between collaborative and non-collaborative de-
signs is measurably higher, but not always decidedly so. 
The non-collaboration scenario illustrated as the star 
network found in figure  1A provides an opportunity 
for municipalities to directly access resources from the 
state. The lack of any intermediaries that may provide 
buffers against the state may place greater burdens 
on municipalities to “fend for themselves.” For muni-
cipalities with higher capacity to plan and implement 
stormwater projects, these arrangements provide them 
greater ability to comply with water quality standards. 
But as we have noted, the problem locations or drivers 
of nonpoint source pollution are not evenly distributed, 
driving the potential for projects with lower returns 
on investment to get implemented over other projects. 
Pooling resources and aggregating project planning 
and implementation at the district scale should lead 
to higher net load reductions. However, this was not 
the case for either voluntary collaboration scenarios. In 
Figure 6. Metrics of Policy Efficacy for Planning-and-Implementation Districts. As capacity increases, amounts of mitigated phosphorus 
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this case, voluntary collaborative governance regimes 
for planning alone and planning and implementa-
tion both scored lower mean load reductions than the 
non-collaborative scenario. We should judge this par-
ticular outcome not as a generalizable outcome, but 
as a property of the particular relationship between a 
municipality’s propensity to collaborate and the geo-
spatial distribution of nonpoint pollution. This finding 
should rather be explained as a specific set of contin-
gencies shaped by municipal willingness to collaborate 
and the geophysical properties of the environmental 
problem. By incentivizing or motivating municipal-
ities to increase their propensity to collaborate, we 
may find that load reduction measures would increase. 
Mandating collaboration for the planning and imple-
mentation of stormwater projects leads to generally 
higher levels of load reductions because it allows for 
a stronger prioritization of projects with higher ROIs.
These findings suggest that in the context of 
nonpoint pollution mitigation, at least, the efficacy 
of collaboration governance regimes is contingent on 
the specific properties of both institutions and ecosys-
tems (Raab, Mannak, and Cambré 2013). Taken more 
broadly, we can conclude that in circumstances when 
governance networks carry out specific regulatory and 
capital-intensive projects that the use of collaborative 
governance regimes should be considered as contin-
gent upon actor’s propensities to collaborate and the 
administrative capacities of central actors. This latter 
point highlights the importance that network struc-
tures play in determining the optimal collaborative 
governance regime type. Here, the properties of the 
network matter, signaling the need for deeper integra-
tion of collaborative and network governance theories.
The contributions of this study to theory develop-
ment include the demonstration of the relationship 
between network governance and collaborative gov-
ernance. As noted earlier, there is compatibility be-
tween collaborative governance typologies of origins 
and network governance typologies of relatively stable 
governance design. Future theory development should 
focus on the relationship between specific structural 
properties of networks and collaborative capacity.
The ability of social-ecological systems to be re-
silient is contingent on their ability to adapt and trans-
form as conditions change (Folke et al. 2002; Gallopín 
2006). There is congruence among dimensions of col-
laborative governance and adaptive capacity theories, 
suggesting that as institutions enable collaboration, 
their ability (and that of the system) to adapt may be 
increased (Emerson and Gerlak 2014).
This study demonstrates the value that ABMs can 
have for theory testing and institutional design and 
contributes to the growing literature regarding the use 
of simulation modeling to test alternative design rules. 
Although we cannot anticipate or model all possible 
futures or conditions, the examination of various con-
figurations of collaborative governance platforms can 
increase learning and adaptive capacity (Ansell and 
Gash 2018; Daniels and Walker 2001; Emerson and 
Gerlak 2014). As we have seen, not all collaborative 
governance schemes may lead to desirable outcomes. 
Thus, the value proposition of collaborative govern-
ance is very likely contingent upon the specific design 
of the collaboration network.
Conclusion
With the nuances of modeling complex governance 
arrangements recognized, there are a number of key 
observations to make relative to some of the core ques-
tions that concern public managers and policymakers. 
The first conclusion is one that is well-trodden, but 
here is empirically validated, is that you simply cannot 
“throw money at the problem” of nonpoint source 
pollution. A  rush to fund at the expense of proper 
planning, targeted focus, and appropriate levels of 
administrative capacity can leave a system rich in fi-
nancial capital, but poor in knowledge, human and 
physical capital, and ultimately, results.
The second main conclusion to be drawn here pertains 
to the importance of administrative capacity. The kind of 
process-based modeling demonstrated here can be very 
useful in determining where and how administrative 
bottlenecks occur, and their relation to program perform-
ance. Strategic investments in administrative capacity are 
critically important, and an assertion that is likely not lost 
on practicing public managers. This fact may, at times, be 
lost on policymakers who are setting the policy agenda 
and making resource allocation decisions. ABMs and 
other process-based models of alternative governance de-
sign can be used to inform policy decisions and ensure 
that administrative capacity is dully considered.
The third main conclusion to be drawn pertains to 
designing for collaborative governance and the effi-
cacy of collaborative and network governance theories 
to inform this process. The apparent inefficiencies of 
voluntary collaboration at both the planning and im-
plementation stages are worth noting again. When 
agency is provided to actors such as municipal agents 
at a finer, localized scale, their limited perceptions of 
the whole system and the collective goals tied to that 
system, may be lost in the specifics of local politics, 
resource constraints and the like. The apparent value 
of mandated collaboration, not just in planning, but in 
project implantation as well, suggests the need to “level 
the playing field” by pressing for stronger coordination 
across scales of government. In this regard, our study 
provides some very important insights regarding man-
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This study highlights the potential uses of dynamic 
models of governance networks (Koliba, Zia, and 
Merrill 2019) to inform actual public policy. The State 
of Vermont is set to enact mandated water districts, and 
this governance model has been credited with helping 
to shape this legislation (Kamman 2019). That this 
model was able to draw on actual project data, pro-
jected nutrient load reductions of those projects, and 
hydrological modeling estimates used by the USEPA 
and the State to set TMDL targets, demonstrates the 
practical use of coupled modeling approaches that in-
corporate alternative governance designs. That policy-
makers in the State of Vermont were involved in the 
design and analysis of this model also underscores the 
potential value of using dynamic modeling to shape le-
gislation and governance arrangements. In this manner, 
policy implementation and governance design can be 
understood as key components of a wider situational 
awareness of a social-ecological system.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material is available at the Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory online.
Funding
This material is based upon work supported by the 
National Science Foundation under VT EPSCoR 
Grant No. NSF OIA 1556770, Lake Champlain 
Basin Resilience to Extreme Events (BREE). This 
work also benefited from collaboration supported by 
the National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center 
(SESYNC) under funding received from the National 
Science Foundation DBI-1052875.
No potential conflict of interest is reported by the 
authors.
References
Ansell, Chris, and Alison Gash. 2008. Collaborative governance in 
theory and practice. Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory 18 (4): 543–71.
———. 2018. Collaborative platforms as a governance strategy. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 28 (1): 
16–32.
Arnold,  J. G., and N. Fohrer. 2005. SWAT2000: Current capabil-
ities and research opportunities in applied watershed modelling. 
Hydrological Processes 19 (3): 563–72.
Batty,  Michael, Andrew  T.  Crooks, Linda  M.  See, and 
Alison  J.  Heppenstall. 2011. Perspectives on Agent-
Based Models and Geographical Systems. In Agent-Based 
Models of Geographical Systems, ed. Alison  J.  Heppenstall, 
Andrew  T.  Crooks, Linda  M.  See, and Michael  Batty, 1–15. 
Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer Science & Business Media.
Bellaubi, Francesc, and Claudia Pahl-Wostl. 2017. Corruption risks, 
management practices, and performance in water service de-
livery in Kenya and Ghana: An agent-based model. Ecology and 
Society 22(2):6.
Bennett, David, and David McGinnis. 2008. Coupled and complex: 
Human–environment interaction in the Greater Yellowstone 
Ecosystem, USA. Geoforum 39 (2): 833–45.
Berardo,  Ramiro, and Mark  Lubell. 2016. Understanding what 
shapes a polycentric governance system. Public Administration 
Review 76 (5): 738–51.
Bitterman,  Patrick, and David  A.  Bennett. 2018. Leveraging 
coupled agent-based models to explore the resilience of 
tightly-coupled land use systems. In Agent-Based Models 
and Complexity Science in the Age of Geospatial Big Data, 
ed. Liliana  Perez, Eun-Kyeong  Kim, and Raja  Sengupta, 17–
30. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. 
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-65993-0_2
Bodin,  Örjan, Annica  Sandström, and Beatrice  Crona. 2017. 
Collaborative networks for effective ecosystem-based manage-
ment: A  set of working hypotheses: Collaborative networks 
and ecosystem management. Policy Studies Journal 45 (2): 
289–314.
Booher,  David  E. 2004. Collaborative governance practices and 
democracy. National Civic Review 93 (4): 32–46.
Booher, David E., and Judith E. Innes. 2010. Governance for resili-
ence: CALFED as a complex adaptive network for resource man-
agement. Ecology and Society 15 (3): art35.
Brummel, Rachel F., Kristen C. Nelson, and Pamela J. Jakes. 2012. 
Burning through organizational boundaries? Examining inter-
organizational communication networks in policy-mandated 
collaborative bushfire planning groups. Global Environmental 
Change 22 (2): 516–28.
Bryson, John M., Barbara C. Crosby, and Melissa Middleton Stone. 
2015. Designing and implementing cross-sector collaborations: 
Needed and challenging. Public Administration Review 75 (5): 
647–63.
Bucini, Gabriela, Scott C. Merrill, Eric Clark, Susan M. Moegenburg, 
Asim Zia, Christopher  J. Koliba, Serge Wiltshire, Luke Trinity, 
and Julia  M.  Smith. 2019. Risk attitudes affect livestock 
biosecurity decisions with ramifications for disease control in a 
simulated production system. Frontiers in Veterinary Science 6 
(June): 196.
Clark,  Richard, Stephanie  Hurley, and Christopher  Koliba. 2018. 
Results of a Municipal Stormwater Capacity Study. Presented at 
the BREE All Hands Meeting, Burlington, VT, June 12. https://
epscor.w3.uvm.edu/2/sites/default/files/general/public/009-chris-
bree-socialsystems-all-hands-june-2018.pdf.
Daniels,  Steven  E., and Gregg  B.  Walker. 2001. Working through 
environmental conflict: The collaborative learning approach. 
Westport, CT: Praeger.
Deadman, P. J. 1999. Modelling individual behaviour and group per-
formance in an intelligent agent-based simulation of the tragedy 
of the commons. Journal of Environmental Management 56 (3): 
159–72.
Eckerd, Adam, Heather Campbell, and Yushim Kim. 2012. Helping 
those like us or harming those unlike us: Illuminating social 
processes leading to environmental injustice. Environment and 
Planning B: Planning and Design 39 (5): 945–64.
Emerson, Kirk, and Andrea K. Gerlak. 2014. Adaptation in collab-
orative governance regimes. Environmental Management 54 (4): 
768–81.
Emerson, Kirk, and Tina Nabatchi. 2015. Collaborative governance 
regimes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Erdlenbruch,  Katrin, and Bruno  Bonté. 2018. Simulating the dy-
namics of individual adaptation to floods. Environmental Science 
& Policy 84 (June): 134–48.
Folke, Carl, Steve Carpenter, Thomas Elmqvist, Lance Gunderson, 
C. S. Holling, and Brian Walker. 2002. Resilience and sustain-
able development: Building adaptive capacity in a world of trans-










ont user on 12 M
arch 2021
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2020, Vol. 30, No. 4654
Gallopín, Gilberto C. 2006. Linkages between vulnerability, resili-
ence, and adaptive capacity. Global Environmental Change 16 
(3): 293–303.
Gassman, P. W., M. R. Reyes, C. H. Green, and J. G. Arnold. 2007. 
The soil and water assessment tool: Historical development, ap-
plications, and future research directions. Transactions of the 
ASABE 50 (4): 1211–50.
Gerlak, A. K. 2005. Federalism and U.S. water policy: Lessons for 
the twenty-first century. Publius 36 (2): 231–57.
Goldstone, Robert L., and Marco A. Janssen. 2005. Computational 
models of collective behavior. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (9): 
424–30.
Grimm,  Volker. 2005. Pattern-oriented modeling of agent-based 
complex systems: Lessons from ecology. Science 310 (5750): 
987–91.
Grimm,  Volker, Uta  Berger, Donald  L.  DeAngelis, J.  Gary  Polhill, 
Jarl Giske, and Steven F. Railsback. 2010. The ODD protocol: 
A  review and first update. Ecological Modelling 221 (23): 
2760–8.
Hamilton, Matthew, and Mark Lubell. 2018. Collaborative govern-
ance of climate change adaptation across spatial and institutional 
scales. Policy Studies Journal 46 (2): 222–47.
Imperial,  Mark  T. 2005. Using collaboration as a governance 
strategy: Lessons from six watershed management programs. 
Administration & Society 37 (3): 281–320.
Isles,  Peter  D.  F., Yaoyang  Xu, Jason  D.  Stockwell, and 
Andrew  W.  Schroth. 2017. Climate-driven changes in energy 
and mass inputs systematically alter nutrient concentration and 
stoichiometry in deep and shallow regions of Lake Champlain. 
Biogeochemistry 133(2):201–17.
Janssen, Marco A., and Jacopo A. Baggio. 2017. Using agent-based 
models to compare behavioral theories on experimental data: 
Application for irrigation games. Journal of Environmental 
Psychology 52 (October): 194–203.
Johnson,  Paul  E. 1999. Simulation modeling in political science. 
American Behavioral Scientist 42 (10): 1509–30.
Kamman,  Neil. 2019. Policy and management implication of 
basin resilience to extreme events research. Presented at the 
Vermont EPSCoR Basin Resilience to Extreme Events All 
Hands Meeting, Colchester, VT, June 4. https://epscor.w3.uvm.
edu/2/node/4675.
Kamensky,  John  M. 2019. What do they want to know? In 
Networks and Collaboration in the Public Sector: Essential 
Research Approaches, Methodologies and Analytic Tools, ed. 
Joris Voets, Robin Keast, and Christopher Koliba, 62. Abingdon, 
UK: Routledge.
Kania, John, and Mark Kramer. 2011. Collective impact. Stanford 
Social Innovation Review 9 (1): 36–41.
Keast, Robyn, and Myrna Mandell. 2014. The collaborative push: 
Moving beyond rhetoric and gaining evidence. Journal of 
Management & Governance 18 (1): 9–28.
Kim, Yushim. 2007. Using spatial analysis for monitoring fraud in 
a public delivery program. Social Science Computer Review 25 
(3): 287–301.
Knieper,  Christian, and Claudia  Pahl-Wostl. 2016. A compara-
tive analysis of water governance, water management, and en-
vironmental performance in river basins. Water Resources 
Management 30 (7): 2161–77.
Koliba, Christopher, Jack W. Meek, Asim Zia, and Russell W. Mills. 
2018. Governance networks in public administration and public 
policy, 2nd ed. Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge.
Koliba, Christopher, Adam Reynolds, Asim Zia, and Steven Scheinert. 
2014. Isomorphic properties of network governance: Comparing 
two watershed governance initiatives in the Lake Champlain 
Basin using institutional network analysis. Complexity, 
Governance & Networks 1 (2): 99–118.
Koliba,  Christopher, Asim  Zia, and Scott  Merrill. 2019. Using 
agent-based models to study network and collaborative govern-
ance. In Researching Networks and Collaboration in the Public 
Sector: A Guide to Approaches, Methodologies, and Analytics, 
ed. J. Voets, R. Keast, and C Koliba, 210–31. New York, NY: 
Routledge.
Koliba,  Christopher, Asim  Zia, Andrew  Schroth, Arne  Bomblies, 
Judy Van Houten, and Donna Rizzo. 2016. The Lake Champlain 
Basin as a complex adaptive system: Insights from the Research 
on Adaptation to Climate Change (RACC) Project. Vermont 
Journal of Environmental Law 17: 533–63.
Koontz, Tomas M., and Elizabeth Moore Johnson. 2004. One size 
does not fit all: Matching breadth of stakeholder participation 
to watershed group accomplishments. Policy Sciences 37 (2): 
185–204.
Koontz, Tomas M., Toddi A. Steelman, J. Carmin, K.S. Korfmacher, 
C. Moseley, and Craig W. Thomas. 2010. Collaborative environ-
mental management: What roles for Government-1. New York, 
NY: Routledge.
Lake Champlain Basin Program. 2018. 2018 State of the Lake and 
Ecosystem Indicators Report. Grand Isle, VT: Lake Champlain 
Basin Program.
Lansing,  J.  Stephen, and James N. Kremer. 1993. Emergent prop-
erties of Balinese water temple networks: Coadaptation on a 
rugged fitness landscape. American Anthropologist, New Series 
95 (1): 97–114.
Ligmann-Zielinska, Arika, and Piotr Jankowski. 2007. Agent-based 
models as laboratories for spatially explicit planning policies. 
Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 34 (2): 
316–35.
Lubell, Mark, Garry Robins, and Peng Wang. 2014. Network struc-
ture and institutional complexity in an ecology of water manage-
ment games. Ecology and Society 19 (4): art23.
Luke, Sean, Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Liviu Panait, Keith Sullivan, and 
Gabriel Balan. 2005. MASON: A multiagent simulation environ-
ment. Simulation 81 (7): 517–27.
Magliocca,  Nicholas  R., and Erle  C.  Ellis. 2013. Using Pattern-
Oriented Modeling (POM) to cope with uncertainty in multi-
scale agent-based models of land change: POM in multi-scale 
ABMs of land change. Transactions in GIS 17 (6): 883–900.
Manson, Steven M. 2005. Agent-based modeling and genetic pro-
gramming for modeling land change in the Southern Yucatán 
Peninsular Region of Mexico. Agriculture, Ecosystems & 
Environment 111 (1–4): 47–62.
Maroulis,  Spiro. 2016. Interpreting school choice treatment ef-
fects: Results and implications from computational experiments. 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 19 (1): 7.
Milio, Simona. 2007. Can administrative capacity explain differences 
in regional performances? Evidence from structural funds imple-
mentation in southern Italy. Regional Studies 41 (4): 429–42.
Milward, H. Brinton, and Keith G Provan. 2006. A manager’s guide 
to choosing and using collaborative networks, Vol 8. Washington, 
DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government.
Nambisan,  Satish, and Robert  A.  Baron. 2009. Virtual customer 
environments: Testing a model of voluntary participation in 
value co-creation activities. Journal of Product Innovation 
Management 26 (4): 388–406.
Norton,  Bryan  G. 2005. Sustainability: A  philosophy of adaptive 
ecosystem management. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of in-
stitutions for collective action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge uni-
versity press.
Pahl-Wostl,  Claudia, Marc  Craps, Art  Dewulf, Erik  Mostert, 
David  Tabara, and Tharsi  Taillieu. 2007. Social learning and 










ont user on 12 M
arch 2021
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2020, Vol. 30, No. 4 655
Pahl-Wostl,  Claudia, Georg  Holtz, Britta  Kastens, and 
Christian  Knieper. 2010. Analyzing complex water govern-
ance regimes: The Management and Transition Framework. 
Environmental Science & Policy 13 (7): 571–81.
Parker,  Dawn  C., Steven  M.  Manson, Marco  A.  Janssen, 
Matthew J. Hoffmann, and Peter Deadman. 2003. Multi-agent 
systems for the simulation of land-use and land-cover change: 
A  review. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
93 (2): 314–37.
Provan, K. G., and P. Kenis. 2007. Modes of network governance: 
Structure, management, and effectiveness. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 18 (2): 229–52.
Raab, J., R. S. Mannak, and B. Cambré. 2013. Combining structure, 
governance, and context: A configurational approach to network 
effectiveness. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 25 (2): 479–511.
Rhodes,  Rod  AW. 1997. Understanding governance: Policy net-
works, governance, reflexivity and accountability. Buckingham, 
UK:Open University Press.
Rodríguez,  Charo, Ann  Langley, François  Béland, and Jean-
Louis  Denis. 2007. Governance, power, and mandated collab-
oration in an interorganizational network. Administration & 
Society 39 (2): 150–93.
Rogers, Ellen, and Edward P. Weber. 2010. Thinking harder about 
outcomes for collaborative governance arrangements. The 
American Review of Public Administration 40 (5): 546–67.
Scheinert,  Steve, Christopher  Koliba, Stephanie  Hurley, 
Sarah  Coleman, and Asim  Zia. 2015. The shape of watershed 
governance: Locating the boundaries of multiplex networks. 
Complexity, Governance & Networks 2 (1): 65–82.
Scheinert,  Steve, Asim Zia, Christopher Koliba, and Scott Merrill. 
2017. Growing collaborations forecasting changes in partner-
ship networks using a bottom-up approach. Policy and Complex 
Systems 3 (1): 3–27.
Schlüter,  Maja, Andres  Baeza, Gunnar  Dressler, Karin  Frank, 
Jürgen Groeneveld, Wander Jager, Marco A. Janssen, et al. 2017. 
A framework for mapping and comparing behavioural theories 
in models of social-ecological systems. Ecological Economics 
131 (January): 21–35.
Schlüter, Maja, and Claudia Pahl-Wostl. 2007. Mechanisms of resili-
ence in common-pool resource management systems: An agent-
based model of water use in a river basin. Ecology and Society 
12 (2): 4.
Scott, Tyler. 2015. Does collaboration make any difference? Linking 
collaborative governance to environmental outcomes: Does col-
laboration make any difference? Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 34 (3): 537–66.
Scott, Tyler A, and Craig W Thomas. 2017. Winners and losers in 
the ecology of games: Network position, connectivity, and the 
benefits of collaborative governance regimes. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 27 (4): 647–60.
Scott,  Tyler  A, Craig  W  Thomas, and José  Manuel  Magallanes. 
2018. Convening for consensus: Simulating stakeholder agree-
ment in collaborative governance processes under different net-
work conditions. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 29 (1): 32–49.
Smajgl, Alexander, Scott Heckbert, John Ward, and Anna Straton. 
2009. Simulating impacts of water trading in an institu-
tional perspective. Environmental Modelling & Software 
24(2):191–201.
Squazzoni,  Flaminio, and Riccardo  Boero. 2010. Complexity-
friendly policy modelling. London, UK: Routledge.
Turrini, Alex, Daniela Cristofoli, Francesca Frosini, and Greta Nasi. 
2009. Networking literature about the determinants of network 
effectiveness. Public Administration 88(2):528–50.
US Environmental Protection Agency. 2016. Phosphorus TMDLs 
for Vermont Segments of Lake Champlain. Boston, MA: US 
Environmetnal Protection Agency. https://www.epa.gov/tmdl/
lake-champlain-phosphorus-tmdl-commitment-clean-water (ac-
cessed May 1, 2019).
US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 2018. Harmful Algal 
Blooms. United States Environmental Protection Agency. https://
www.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/harmful-algal-blooms (accessed 
May 1, 2019).
Vermont Division of Environmental Conservation (VTDEC). 
2019. Clean Water Portal. https://anrweb.vt.gov/DEC/
cleanWaterDashboard/WPDSearch.aspx (accessed May 5, 
2019).
Vermont General Assembly. 2019. Bill Status S.96 (Act 76). 
Vermont General Assembly. https://legislature.vermont.gov/bill/
status/2020/S.96 (accessed July 1, 2019).
Watkins,  Cristy, Dean  Massey, Jeremy  Brooks, Kristen  Ross, and 
Moira L. Zellner. 2013. Understanding the mechanisms of col-
lective decision making in ecological restoration: An agent-based 
model of actors and organizations. Ecology and Society 18 (2): 
32.
Wiltshire,  Serge, Asim  Zia, Christopher  Koliba, Gabriela  Buccini, 
Eric  Clark, Scott  Merrill, Julie  Smith, and Susan  Moegenburg. 
2019. Network meta-metrics: Using evolutionary computation 
to identify E Ective indicators of epidemiological vulnerability 
in a livestock production system model. Journal of Artificial 
Societies and Social Simulation 22 (2): 8.
Zia, Asim, Arne Bomblies, Andrew W. Schroth, Christopher Koliba, 
Peter  D.  F.  Isles, Yushiou  Tsai, Ibrahim  N.  Mohammed, et  al. 
2016. Coupled impacts of climate and land use change across 
a river–lake continuum: Insights from an Integrated Assessment 
Model of Lake Champlain’s Missisquoi Basin, 2000–2040. 
Environmental Research Letters 11 (11): 114026.
Zia,  Asim, and Christopher  Koliba. 2013. The emergence of at-
tractors under multi-level institutional designs: Agent-based 
modeling of intergovernmental decision making for funding 










ont user on 12 M
arch 2021
